Under California law, service by publication is strictly controlled by statute and case law. Code of Civil Procedure section 415.50 provides that “a summons may be served by publication if upon affidavit it appears… that the party to be served cannot with reasonable diligence be served in another manner… and that either (1) a cause of action exists against [them]… or (2) they have an interest in California property subject to the court’s jurisdiction”. In practice, a plaintiff must file a motion (often ex parte) and supporting affidavits showing exhaustive, good-faith efforts to locate the defendant by all other means (personal delivery, mail, etc.). The statute directs the court to publish the summons in a newspaper “most likely to give actual notice” in California, and – if the defendant “resides or is located out of this state” – the court may also order publication in an out‑of‑state newspaper likely to reach that party. The order must further direct mailing the summons and complaint to any newly discovered address before the publication period expires. Publication runs at least four weeks as provided by Government Code §6064, and service is deemed complete at the end of that period. Under CCP §415.50(e), the court may relax some requirements for database searches (e.g. DMV or voter rolls) if law prohibits such access.

Courts emphasize that publication is a “last resort.” Both statute and case law require the plaintiff to prove that service by any authorized method proved impossible. For example, Watts v. Crawford (1995) reaffirmed that if a defendant’s address is ascertainable, “a method of service superior to publication must be employed” – publication is allowed only “as a last resort”. The trial court must find the defendant “cannot with reasonable diligence be served” by any other method. Likewise, practical guides confirm that a court will grant publication only after exhaustive search efforts. One guide states: publication “is considered a method of last resort” and the plaintiff must demonstrate “thorough, exhaustive attempts to locate the other party”. California cases likewise insist on “exhaustive attempts to locate the defendant,” since publication “rarely results in actual notice”. In short, a judge should deny a motion for publication unless the record shows diligent, systematic search (e.g. contacting relatives, employers, public records, etc.) and an affidavit under CCP §415.50 establishing that all other methods failed.

If granted, the court must choose a newspaper of general circulation in the location most likely to reach the out-of-state defendant. For example, if the defendant is known to reside in Illinois, the court would typically order publication in a newspaper in Illinois (as well as possibly in California) to maximize the chance of actual notice. If the defendant’s address is later discovered before publication ends, the court’s order must require mailing the summons and complaint to that address. If the defendant is ultimately served by any other valid method (e.g. substituted service, mail) before publication is complete, that service supersedes publication.

Jurisdictional and Due Process Limits

Even when statutory requirements are met, constitutional due process and jurisdictional rules constrain the use of publication on out-of-state defendants. Under CCP §410.10, California’s jurisdictional reach is coextensive with constitutional due process. The U.S. Supreme Court’s foundational rule is that notice must be “reasonably calculated” to inform interested parties, and publication alone is constitutionally suspect when other methods could have been used. Mullane v. Central Hanover, 339 U.S. 306 (1950), held that notice by publication may be insufficient if the parties’ names and addresses are known. Mullane explained that publication is justified only when other means (mail or personal delivery) are impracticable: “where the names and post office addresses… are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to [publication]”. Earlier cases likewise condemned rote publication: if a technically domiciled resident “has left the state with no intention to return,” mere publication is “not reasonably calculated” to give notice. In short, federal due process requires courts to balance practical notice against fairness; California courts interpret this strictly.

For an out-of-state defendant, personal jurisdiction must independently be found. California’s long-arm statute (CCP §410.10) permits jurisdiction on any basis consistent with due process, but minimum-contacts analysis (International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)) still applies. Absent specific statutory long-arm bases (e.g. transaction of business in California, contract, property, tort causing effects here, etc.), mere publication service in itself does not create jurisdiction. If the defendant has significant ties to California – for example, domiciled here at time of suit – jurisdiction may attach. Under CCP §417 (applicable to publication cases involving property or status), the court can enter a personal judgment against an out-of-state defendant only if the defendant was personally served outside California and was a California resident (domiciliary) when the action commenced or was served. In Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal.2d 235 (1955), a nonresident defendant (served by publication and personal service in New York) moved to vacate a divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds. The California Supreme Court held that the statute’s requirement of being a “resident of this state” meant domicile, and affirmed jurisdiction where evidence showed the defendant’s ongoing California domicile despite his temporary absence. Thus, if an out-of-state defendant was never domiciled or present in California and has no in-state property claim, a court would lack personal jurisdiction even if publication occurred.

Challenging Service by Publication in California

A defendant served by publication in California may challenge the procedure both before and after entry of judgment. Before default or verdict, the defendant must make a special appearance to challenge service without submitting to jurisdiction. California law does not provide a direct right to interlocutory appeal of an order granting publication. Instead, one may seek extraordinary relief. For example, in Miller v. Superior Court, 195 Cal.App.2d 779 (1961), the defendant petitioned for a writ of mandate to vacate an order denying his motion to quash publication service. The Court of Appeal recognized that an order permitting publication (denying a quash motion) could be reviewed by petition if personal jurisdiction was denied. In practice, a judge hearing a motion to quash will scrutinize the plaintiff’s affidavits and evidence of due diligence, the validity of the newspaper selected, and any indication the defendant’s address was knowable. If the court finds a failure of diligence or a statutory misstep, it must quash the service order.

After judgment (usually a default judgment), the defendant may attack on several fronts. First, code section 473(b) allows a court to relieve a party from default or judgment due to mistake or excusable neglect – a motion that should be supported by evidence (e.g. that the plaintiff did not properly serve the summons). More fundamentally, California law holds that a judgment obtained without due process is void. A defendant can move to vacate the judgment under CCP §473(d) (for void judgments) or by a special proceeding. If such a motion or petition is denied, the defendant may appeal the final judgment. On appeal, the focus will be on whether jurisdiction was lacking. California courts have vacated judgments where service by publication violated due process (for example, where a defendant’s address was actually known or could have been found). Conversely, if the court’s order for publication complied with CCP §415.50 and the defendant truly was unreachable, the judgment will usually be upheld.

California Remedies and Appeals (Procedural)

In summary, an adverse order permitting publication is interlocutory, so the usual route is collateral attack. Practically, an out-of-state defendant should promptly file a motion to quash service (if they learn of the action before default) or move to vacate any default judgment under CCP §§473 or 1008. If the trial court refuses relief, the defendant can petition the appellate court for a writ of mandate or, after final judgment, appeal the judgment. Throughout, the defendant will argue lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficient notice as violations of due process. The burden on the defendant in an appeal or writ is to show that the statutory requirements (affidavit of inability to serve, diligent search) or constitutional notice standards (Mullane) were not met.

Illinois Law: Publication and Enforcement

If the defendant is a resident of Illinois, Illinois law also tightly limits publication service. Under 735 ILCS 5/2-206, service by publication is allowed only in actions affecting property or status (e.g. divorce, land disputes). The plaintiff must file an affidavit showing the defendant “resides or has gone out of this State, or on due inquiry cannot be found,” and give the last known residence if known. The court then orders publication in a newspaper of the county where the action is pending and requires mailing a copy of the notice to any known address. Illinois statutes do not authorize publication in another state’s newspaper – even if the defendant is in California, Illinois law limits publication to an Illinois paper. (By contrast, California’s 415.50 expressly permits publication in an out-of-state paper if the defendant is outside California.)

In Illinois court, a defendant challenging publication must typically do so in a special appearance (to avoid submitting to jurisdiction) by filing a Section 2‑1301 petition or motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction. As in California, any defect in service by publication renders a personal judgment void. Illinois courts have held that a default judgment based on improper publication service is void and “may be attacked at any time” by a post-judgment petition (735 ILCS 5/2‑1401). The statutory vehicle is Section 2‑1301 or 2‑1401: under 2‑1401, for example, a defendant can seek to vacate a void default judgment any time by showing “defective service.” In Abbington Trace Condominium Ass’n v. McKeller, 2016 IL App (2d) 150913, ¶ 10, the court stated that whether personal jurisdiction was obtained via defective service is reviewed de novo and, if a judgment is void, 2‑1401 relief is available.

Finally, if a California judgment by publication is presented for enforcement in Illinois, the Illinois Uniform Foreign Judgment Act applies (735 ILCS 5/12‑620 et seq.). Illinois courts will generally enforce out‑of‑state judgments under the Full Faith and Credit principle, but not if due process was denied. Specifically, 735 ILCS 5/12‑621 provides that a foreign-country judgment need not be recognized if “the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant”. Section 12‑665 lists safe harbors: the judgment cannot be refused recognition for jurisdictional defects if the defendant was personally served in the foreign forum, appeared voluntarily, agreed to jurisdiction, or was domiciled there. Service by publication alone is not a listed safe harbor. Thus, an Illinois defendant served only by California publication could argue that California lacked jurisdiction and so Illinois should not enforce the judgment. The defendant would bear the burden of proving a basis for nonrecognition (such as lack of personal service). In practice, Illinois courts look to whether the defendant had sufficient connection to California or consented to that forum; if not, the Illinois court may refuse to register or enforce the California judgment.

Key Case Law

Notable cases illustrate these rules. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 (1950), sets the due-process benchmark: notice must be “reasonably calculated” to reach the party, and publication alone cannot suffice when better options exist. Watts v. Crawford, 10 Cal.4th 743 (1995), reaffirmed that publication is a last resort and requires exhaustive search efforts. In Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal.2d 235 (1955), the California Supreme Court enforced the statute (CCP §417) that an out-of-state defendant must be a California resident (in fact, domiciled here) at suit or service time for a valid personal judgment; publication alone did not confer jurisdiction absent that residency. Illinois cases similarly hold that a judgment following defective publication is void and open to collateral attack. Throughout, the guiding principle is fairness: service by publication may be authorized by statute, but it cannot override fundamental due process.

Sources: California Code Civ. Proc. §415.50; Cal. Gov’t Code §6064; Watts v. Crawford, 10 Cal.4th 743, 748–49 (1995); Mullane v. Central Hanover, 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal.2d 235, 242–46 (1955); Miller v. Superior Court, 195 Cal.App.2d 779, 783–85 (1961); CCP §410.10; 735 ILCS 5/2-206; 735 ILCS 5/2-1301; 735 ILCS 5/2-1401; 735 ILCS 5/12-621, 12-665.